Although biologists and philosophers of science generally agree that genes cannot determine the forms of biological and psychological traits, students, journalists, politicians, and other members of the general public nonetheless continue to embrace genetic determinism. This article identifies some of the concerns typically raised by individuals when they first encounter the systems perspective that biologists and philosophers of science now favor over genetic determinism, and uses arguments informed by that perspective to address those concerns. No definitive statements can yet be (...) made about why genetic determinism has proven so resilient in the face of empirical evidence pointing up its deficiencies, but conveying the essential interdependence of 'nature' and 'nurture' to the general public will likely require deployment of the arguments that systems theorists ordinarily use to reject genetic determinism. In addition, the elaboration of new metaphors that focus attention on the dynamic nature of trait construction will likely prove valuable, because re-conceptualizing notions like 'genes' and 'nature' will probably be one of the most effective ways to help students and the general public abandon the genetic determinism that biologists now recognize as indefensible. (shrink)

Elizabeth Spelke's What Babies Know is a scholarly presentation of core knowledge theory and a masterful compendium of empirical evidence that supports it. Unfortunately, Spelke's principal theoretical assumption is that core knowledge is simply the innate product of cognitive evolution. As such, her theory fails to explicate the developmental mechanisms underlying the emergence of the cognitive systems on which that knowledge depends.

Neural reuse theories should interest developmental psychologists because these theories can potentially illuminate the developmental relations among psychological characteristics observed across the lifespan. Characteristics that develop by exploiting pre-existing neural circuits can be thought of as developmental homologues. And, understood in this way, the homology concept that has proven valuable for evolutionary biologists can be used productively to study psychological/behavioral development.

Polygenic scores cannot elucidate the mechanisms that produce behavioral phenotypes (including “intelligence”). Therefore, they are unlikely to yield helpful interventions. Moreover, they are poor predictors of individuals' developmental outcomes. Burt's critique is well-supported by the details of molecular biology. Specifically, experiences affect epigenetic factors that influence phenotypes via how the genome functions, a fact that lends support to Burt's conclusions.